In this paper, we argue that computer simulations can provide valuable insights into the performance of voting methods on different collective decision problems. This could improve institutional design, even when there is no general theoretical result to support the optimality of a voting method. To support our claim, we first describe a decision problem that has not received much theoretical attention in the literature. We outline different voting methods to address that collective decision problem. Under certain criteria of assessment akin (...) to extensions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, we run simulations for the methods using MATLAB, in order to compare their performance under various conditions. We consider and respond to concerns about the use of simulations in the assessment of voting procedures for policymaking. (shrink)

The standard definition of “argument” is satisfied by any series of statements in which one (of the statements) is marked as the conclusion of the others. This leads to the counter-intuitive result that “I like cookies, therefore, all swans are white” is an argument, since “therefore” marks “all swans are white” as the conclusion of “I like cookies”. This objection is often disregarded by stating that, although the previous sequence is an argument, it fails to be a good one. However, (...) when we compare our previous argument with a definitely bad argument like “this swan is white, therefore, all swans are white”, we see that there is an important difference between them. Whereas the former fails to fulfil our intuition of what an argument is, the latter does qualify as an argument, but as a bad one. In this talk, I will sketch a definition that better captures this feature of our intuition of what an argument is in three steps. Following Díez and Moulines (1999), I first reduce inductive validity to deductive validity through what we may call the method of deductivisation. Second, through epistemic predicates (cf. Thompson 2002), I introduce a broader concept of validity that accounts not only for deductive and inductive validity, but also for a weaker type of validity that may be called pseudo-validity. I show that these pseudo-valid arguments can also be deductivised with the help of the above-mentioned epistemic predicates. Finally, I re-define the concept of argument as any series of statements that is at least pseudo-valid, which leaves the “cookies argument” outside of this definition. (shrink)

The Dominican Pedro de Ledesma was a member of the School of Salamanca, professor of Theology in the late 16th and early 17th century. Here we investigate for the first time his contribution to the «de auxiliis» controversy, in which mainly the Dominicans and the Jesuits contended about human free will and God’s influence on it. Among the various theological problems involved, this thesis examines the nature of the divine concurrence in free human action and, in particular, divine concurrence in (...) actual efficacious grace. Ledesma focuses his contribution to this debate on the real (and not only moral) difference between sufficient and efficacious grace. Another original feature of his conception of divine concurrence and efficacious grace are the target of his attacks, since he does not only dispute the theology of the Jesuit Luis de Molina, but also that of several Dominicans, such as Juan Vicente de Astorga; likewise, he opposes Pedro de Herrera and Diego Álvarez with a less sophisticated conception of «physical premotion» than theirs. This thesis updates Ledesma’s intellectual biography and contains the most complete list of his manuscript work to date. Ledesma’s ideas are studied on the basis of three documents: first, his unpublished lectures of 1590 on divine concurrence; second, the report on Molina’s Concordia sent to the Inquisition in 1594 (a manuscript hitherto neglected, and transcribed in the Appendix); third, the book on the dispute completed in 1601 and published in 1611. (shrink)

In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' in which he claimed to present a counterexample to the so-called 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities' ('a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise'). The success of Frankfurt-style cases as counterexamples to the Principle has been much debated since. I present an objection to these cases that, in questioning their conceptual cogency, undercuts many of those debates. Such cases (...) all require a counterfactual mechanism that could cause an agent to perform an action that he cannot avoid performing. I argue that, given our concept of what it is for someone to act, this requirement is inconsistent. Frankfurt-style alleged counterexamples are cases where an agent is morally responsible for an action he performs even though, the claim goes, he could not have avoided performing that action. However, it has recently been argued, e.g. by John Fischer, that a counterexample to the Principle could be a 'Fischer-style case', i.e. a case where the agent can either perform the action or do nothing else. I argue that, although Fischer-style cases do not share the conceptual flaw common to all Frankfurt-style cases, they also fail as counterexamples to the Principle. The paper finishes with a brief discussion of the significance of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. (shrink)

This paper contains five observations concerning the intended meaning of the intuitionistic logical constants: (1) if the explanations of this meaning are to be based on a non-decidable concept, that concept should not be that of `proof"; (2) Kreisel"s explanations using extra clauses can be significantly simplified; (3) the impredicativity of the definition of → can be easily and safely ameliorated; (4) the definition of → in terms of `proofs from premises" results in a loss of the inductive character of (...) the definitions of ∨ and ∃ and (5) the same occurs with the definition of ∀ in terms of `proofs with free variables". (shrink)

Reasons can play a variety of roles in a variety of contexts. For instance, reasons can motivate and guide us in our actions (and omissions), in the sense that we often act in the light of reasons. And reasons can be grounds for beliefs, desires and emotions and can be used to evaluate, and sometimes to justify, all these. In addition, reasons are used in explanations: both in explanations of human actions, beliefs, desires, emotions, etc., and in explanations of a (...) wide range of phenomena involving all sorts of animate and inanimate substances. This diversity has encouraged the thought that the term 'reason' is ambiguous or has different senses in different contexts. Moreover, this view often goes hand in hand with the claim that reasons of these different kinds belong to different ontological categories: to facts (or something similar) in the case of normative/justifying reasons, and to mental states in the case of motivating/explanatory reasons. In this paper I shall explore some of the main roles that reasons play and, on that basis, I shall offer a classification of kinds of reasons. As will become clear, my classification of reasons is at odds with much of the literature in several respects: first, because of my views about how we should understand the claim that reasons are classified into different kinds; second, because of the kinds into which I think reasons should be classified; and, finally, because of the consequences I think this view has for the ontology of reasons. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a way of characterizing human agency in terms of the concept of a two‐way power. I outline this conception of agency, defend it against some objections, and briefly indicate how it relates to free agency and to moral praise‐ and blameworthiness.

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra offers a fresh philosophical account of properties. How is it that two different things (such as two red roses) can share the same property (redness)? According to resemblance nominalism, things have their properties in virtue of resembling other things. This unfashionable view is championed with clarity and rigor.

This is the introduction to the special issue of the Spanish journal Ágora-Papeles de Filosofía (31/2, 2012) devoted to new Ibero-American contributions to metatheoretical structuralism.

Two conceptions of motivating reasons, i.e. the reasons for which we act, can be found in the literature: (1) the dominant 'psychological conception', which says that motivating reasons are an agent's believing something; and (2) the 'non-psychological' conception, the minority view, which says that they are what the agent believes, i.e. his beliefs. In this paper I outline a version of the minority view, and defend it against what have been thought to be insuperable difficulties - in particular, difficulties concerning (...) 'error cases' (cases where what the agent believes is false); and difficulties concerning the explanation of action. Concerning error cases, I argue that if we are motivated by something believed that is true, what motivates us to act is a motivating reason. By contrast, if we are motivated by something believed that is false, then what motivates us to act is merely an apparent motivating reason. Either way, what motivates us is, as the non-psychological conception says, what we believe and not our believing it. I offer an account of the relation between motivating reasons and the explanation of action, and argue that this account helps bring out two important points. One is that the fact that we often do, and indeed sometimes must, use explanations such as 'He did it because he believed that p' does not vindicate the psychological conception of motivating reasons. The other is that endorsing the non-psychological conception of motivating reasons does not commit one to a non-factive view of explanations of action. (shrink)

Ignorance is often a perfectly good excuse. There are interesting debates about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake subvert obligation, but little disagreement about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake exculpate. What about agents who have all the relevant facts in view but fail to meet their obligations because they do not have the right moral beliefs? If their ignorance of their obligations derives from mistaken moral beliefs or from ignorance of the moral significance of the facts they have in (...) view, should they be excused for failing to meet their moral obligations? It is not obvious that they should. In this paper we argue that the best non-skeptical accounts of moral responsibility acknowledge that factual ignorance and mistake will diminish moral responsibility in a way that moral ignorance and mistake will not. That is because factual ignorance is often non-culpable so long as it meets certain merely procedural epistemic standards but the same is not true of moral ignorance. Our argument is that the assumption that it is gets the standards of culpability for moral ignorance wrong, and that the mistake is encouraged by the thought that culpability in general requires an instance of known wrongdoing: that acting wrongly requires de dicto unresponsiveness to one’s obligations at some stage. We deny this and conclude that, therefore, ignorance and mistaken belief are indeed often perfectly good excuses – but far less often than some philosophers claim. (shrink)

En este artículo se presentan resultados de un proyecto de investigación que se propuso analizar trayectorias de clase de familias del Área Metropolitana de Buenos Aires pertenecientes a sectores medios. Entre las estrategias cualitativas, se han realizado 18 entrevistas semiestructuradas a mujeres y varones nacidos en la década de 1950 y en la década de 1970, con el fin de comparar los acontecimientos biográficos y familiares de estas dos cohortes, según la posición de clase a través del tiempo. El análisis (...) de las entrevistas sugiere que existen representaciones compartidas entre distintos perfiles de personas pertenecientes a sectores medios respecto de las oportunidades y especialmente de las limitaciones que ha presentado Argentina en el largo plazo para el bienestar material y la mejora en las condiciones de vida. -/- Representations about living conditions in Argentina from metropolitan middle class Abstract. This article presents results of a research project that aimed to analyze class trajectories of families in the Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires belonging to middle classes. Among the qualitative strategies, 18 semi-structured interviews have been carried out with women and men born in the 1950s and the 1970s, in order to compare the biographical and family events of these two cohorts, according to class position through time. The analysis of the interviews suggests that there are shared representations among different profiles of people belonging to middle sectors regarding the opportunities and especially about limitations that Argentina has presented in the long term for material well-being and improvement in living conditions. Keywords: living conditions; Argentina; representations; social class; generation. (shrink)

Gilles Deleuze’s research during the 1980s focused on the 17th century German thinker G. W. Leibniz. In 1988, Deleuze published Le Pli, which forms part of a series of works on modern philosophy. This book displays Deleuze’s attention to the interpretations of contemporary commentators on modern philosophy, in this case, on Leibniz. In this context, there occurred a brief and important dialogue between Deleuze and Christiane Frémont, the French commentator and translator of Leibniz, with regard to their respective interpretations of (...) the great German philosopher. This article intends to give an account of the main topics present in that conversation. Firstly, we can say they involve 1) the problem of body and the Leibnizian vinculum substantiale, 2) the question of singularities, 3) the principle of economy and incompossibility, and 4) the Deleuzian concept of vice-diction. Our hypothesis in this study is that the readings made by both authors of the German thinker are mutually involved. It is essential, in order to support this hypothesis, to make precise the demarcations of relations between such readings. For this reason, our research will focus on Frémont’s study Singularités, individus et relations dans le système de Leibniz (2003) and on Deleuze’s work Le Pli (1988). We hope to determine the topics that emerge in the relationship, and to specify convergences and divergences of interpretation. (shrink)

This paper seeks a better understanding of the elements of practical reasoning: premises and conclusion. It argues that the premises of practical reasoning do not normally include statements such as ‘I want to ϕ’; that the reasoning in practical reasoning is the same as in theoretical reasoning and that what makes it practical is, first, that the point of the relevant reasoning is given by the goal that the reasoner seeks to realize by means of that reasoning and the subsequent (...) action; second, that the premises of such reasoning show the goodness of the action to be undertaken; third, that the conclusions of such reasoning may be actions or decisions, that can be accompanied by expressions of intention, either in action, or for the future; and that these are justified, and might be contradicted, in ways that are not only peculiar to them (i.e. in ways that diverge from those found in theoretical reasoning), but are distinctively practical, in that they involve reference to reasons for acting and to expressions of intention, respectively.1. (shrink)

Comme Bergson clarifie, il est nécessaire de distinguer la multiplicité numérique, propred'éléments homogènes dans l'espace, de celle qui est intensive qui représente le déroulement de la durée ou temporalité (Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience). Pour Deleuze, qui reprendre cette distinction (Différence et répétition, Logique du sens), l'intensité constitue cette différence radicale qui produit des séries de succession hétérogènes dont le déroulement détermine la forme du temps. De cette façon, une sérieintensive dans la succession temporaire engage son propre (...) développement avec celui ded'une autre différente avec lequel elle se trouve en tension. La durée est composée, donc,d'une succession multiple de séries identifiées entre eux. Ici, Deleuze reprend la notion leibnizienne d'incompossibilité (Le Pli). Celle-ci représente l'incompatibilité entre le mondeeffectivement créé et l'infinité de mondes possibles que la divinité a pu concevoir. Deleuzecroit, cependant, qu'il est nécessaire de reconnaître que l'incompatibilité entre les séries d'événements menace incessamment au monde et ne constitue pas seulement unedisjonction à résoudre par la divinité au moment de le créer. Alors, notre article tenteradéterminer la manière dans laquelle Deleuze reprend la pensée de Bergson et de Leibnizpour traiter les sujets proposés. (shrink)

The Foucault’s conception of power, so as those instructions that lead to think the body as a surface or exteriority, enable to suppose that body transcends the restrictive context with the one usually associated with. For that, it’s necessary to inquire into the Foucault’s form to think about the exteriority; principally the one that persists between visibility and enunciation. This subject will be analyzed starting from the multiples forms with which they appear in the foucaultian’s proposition, especially about the clinic (...) and the explanation of the passage from classic to modern culture. (shrink)

Despite the distance between the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and of Deleuze, it is possible to discover not only analogue complicity with regard to thecriticism addressed to Husserl. In the aesthetic, for example, we note that the last thoughtsof Merleau-Ponty, present mainly in The visible and the invisible, are a constant referencefor the works that Deleuze dedicates to the painter Francis Bacon. In the present researchwe expect to define the passages on account of the reading of Husserl, and to show thepoint (...) of contact between Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze. So, we hope to change the image of apparent indifference with regard to understanding their philosophies. (shrink)

Uno de los aspectos que resaltan en la obra de Dante es su persistente manera de atacar a la Iglesia Romana y la Divina comedia abunda en ataques directos a una serie de Papas en cuyas obras corruptas Dante acusa la decadencia de la institución eclesiástica y la crisis de la concepción política medieval. Los argumentos de Dante contra el papado corren principalmente por dos vías. La primera, se dedica a evidenciar la corrupción del clero y sus inconvenientes, siendo la (...) Divina Comedia la más completa recopilación de estos ataques. La segunda se embarca en un profundo cuestionamiento al poder temporal que se ha arrogado el Papado Medieval, situación a la que se culpa de los problemas de corrupción que vive el mundo -entre los que se cuentan la anarquía italiana. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se ocupa del lugar de la religión en la última etapa de la obra de Habermas. En la primera parte se muestran las diferentes aristas de la cuestión de la religión, poniendo énfasis en los aspectos filosófico-políticos, sobre todo el que concierne a la “traducción” del lenguaje religioso al secular como un “requisito” de acceso a la esfera pública. En la segunda parte, se reconstruye, señalando sus límites o dificultades, el concepto de “traducción” en Habermas. Para ello, (...) se apela, además, a algunas categorías conceptuales propuestas por Jean-Marc Ferry. La traducción en este marco puede ser entendida en dos sentidos: como una reformulación semántica que apunta a ampliar el universo discursivo de origen (traducción como desencapsulamiento) y como una transformación de los géneros pre o para-argumentativos en argumentativos (traducción como cambio de género discursivo). (shrink)

Many approaches have been taken regarding this topic, some of them are anthropological or scientific that pursue the understanding of why we eat meat, but from the philosophical lens this question is solved in the field of applied ethics, which is the area that debate about the moral status of animals (nonhuman animals) and where different theorizations that tried to explain the relationship between animals and humans and the examination of the morality of meat consumption take place. Some of these (...) approaches could be find within the concepts of animal rights, vegetarianism, animal cruelty and so on. (shrink)

RESUMENEl presente trabajo tiene por objetivo reconstruir sistemáticamente la “hermenéutica trascendental” de Karl-Otto Apel. En primer lugar, se describe el desarrollo de la interpretación apeliana de Heidegger, la cual consideramos que puede ser dividida en cuatro momentos. En segundo lugar, se explican los principales puntos de disenso de Apel con la hermenéutica filosófica de Gadamer. A lo largo del trabajo sugerimos, además, posibles caminos teóricos abiertos para la hermenéutica trascendental en tanto programa filosófico de investigación. ABSTRACTThis paper aims to systematically (...) reconstruct "transcendental hermeneutics" of Karl-Otto Apel. Firstly, we describe the development of Heidegger's apelian interpretation, which we consider can be divided into four stages. Secondly, we explain the main points of disagreement of Apel with Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. Throughout the work we suggest further possible theoretical opened paths to transcendental hermeneutics as philosophical research program. (shrink)

This paper presents some annotations on mental health, from the point of view of implicit notions of madness. To this end, we propose a distinction between the medical, phenomenological existential and socio-critical models. We focus in the latter two in order to achieve a critical approach about the subject, dominated by the medical perspective. According to Foucault's earliest works, this article begins by evaluating criteria of normality in terms of the historical genesis of madness concept. Then, we describe the medical (...) model based on the distinction between illness and symptom. Later, we focus on the phenomenological-existential model to describe the ontological fragility in Laing, i.e. the original core of the self and the world experienced by the schizophrenic person. Finally, we add some considerations related to the social origin of schizophrenia, as stated in the Cooper's and Foucault's perspectives. (shrink)

Considerando traços da conceptualização das noções de “repetição” e “hábito”, presentes em Empirisme et subjectivité (DELEUZE, 1953, em diante ES), esperamos fazer algumas anotações acerca do percurso que leva até Différence et répétition, tese que Deleuze apresenta em 1968 (doravante DR), cujo capítulo II se debruça na constituição da síntese do presente. Para tanto, será necessário estabelecermos duas etapas na determinação desse percurso. Na primeira etapa, abordaremos a forma em que Deleuze descreve o hábito como princípio complementar ao princípio de (...) experiência na construção do conhecimento. A segunda etapa do percurso requer detalhar a forma em que se produz a articulação das noções citadas em DR. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se propone señalar algunas tareas posibles para la ética del discurso de Karl-Otto Apel en la actualidad. Tales tareas pueden concentrarse en la necesidad de una teoría de la institucionalización del discurso práctico, como forma de racionalidad práctica realizada socialmente. La pregunta que se ha de responder es qué condiciones marco debe cumplir el discurso para que pueda ser puesto en práctica y qué efectos político-institucionales puede producir en el contexto de instituciones realmente existentes. A partir de (...) Gehlen y de Luhmann -aunque en menor medida-, Apel interpreta a las instituciones como sistemas de autoafirmación que, por un lado, liberan a los sujetos de la carga de la acción, pero, por otro lado, limitan o condicionan la racionalidad práctica consensual-argumentativa propia del discurso. Las coerciones (Sachzwänge) funcionales de las instituciones configuran un campo de acción y un tipo de racionalidad que, de acuerdo con Apel, deberían estar bajo el control del discurso institucionalizado como esfera pública racional (Öffentlichkeit). La relación entre los criterios normativos ideales del discurso práctico institucionalizado y las instituciones realmente existentes debe interpretarse como una tensión o entrelazamiento dialéctico no superable. Si esta interpretación es correcta, la ética del discurso, en tanto teoría crítica de la sociedad, no puede ser entendida como una aplicación sin más de criterios normativos ideales a la realidad histórica o de adecuación de esa realidad a los criterios ideales en su sentido vertical, sino como de mutua correlación horizontal. (shrink)

The value of testimony as a source of knowledge has been a subject of epistemological debates. The "trust theory of testimony" suggests that human testimony is based on an affective relationship supported by social norms. However, the advent of generative artificial intelligence challenges our understanding of genuine testimony. The concept of "quasi-testimony" seeks to characterize utterances produced by non-human entities that mimic testimony but lack certain fundamental attributes. This article analyzes these issues in depth, exploring philosophical perspectives on testimony and (...) the implications of conversational AI technologies on our epistemic practices. (shrink)

The epistemic status of Natural Selection has intrigued to biologists and philosophers since the very beginning of the theory to our present times. One prominent contemporary example is Elliott Sober, who claims that Natural Selection, and some other theories in biology, and maybe in economics, are peculiar in including explanatory models/conditionals that are a priori in a sense in which explanatory models/conditionals in Classical Mechanics and most other standard theories are not. In this paper, by analyzing what we take to (...) be the four possible interpretations of Sober’s claim, we argue that, terminological preferences aside, the possible senses in which explanatory models in Natural Selection can qualify, or include elements that can qualify, as a priori, also apply to Classical Mechanics and other standard, highly unified theories. (shrink)

The gulf between philosophical and formal ontology can and should be bridged. In this Editorial, I elaborate briefly on this subject.

La presente investigación se propone mostrar la génesis y desarrollo de la tentativa matriz de la filosofía de Gilles Deleuze, el empirismo trascendental. Para ello, se realizará una revisión de las problemáticas por las que atraviesa dicha tentativa a lo largo de la obra de este pensador. Cuidadosa atención recibirán a propósito de la génesis del empirismo trascendental el problema del hábito y el de la constitución de la subjetividad, que Deleuze reconoce en Hume (Empirisme et subjectivité, 1953). A partir (...) de ellos, se establecerán los caracteres principales del que se identifica como problema de los principios, en cuyo seno se define una relación particular entre principio y génesis. Gracias al establecimiento riguroso de dicha relación, Deleuze integra los aportes del empirismo y los de la filosofía trascendental bajo una misma propuesta filosófica. Esta propuesta tendrá a la vista el desarrollo de una crítica sistemática hacia lo dado, con lo cual tanto el objeto como el sujeto del pensar precisarán ser sometidos a una indagación acerca de su génesis. Definido el empirismo trascendental como la tentativa filosófica que apunta a pensar la génesis trascendental o actualización de lo dado, esta investigación espera dar cuenta del ámbito de dicha génesis así como de los principios de determinación que la rigen. Para ello se estudiarán las nociones de campo trascendental, plan de inmanencia y continuo ideal (Différence et répétition, 1968; Logique du sens, 1969). Al abordar esta última noción, se pondrá especial interés en dilucidar la reformulación que efectúa Deleuze de los princip ios de razón suficiente, de indiscernibilidad y de continuidad de Leibniz (Le Pli, 1988). (shrink)

A distinction is introduced between itemized and non-itemized plural predication. It is argued that a full-fledged system of plural logic is not necessary in order to account for the validity of inferences concerning itemized collective predication. Instead, it is shown how this type of inferences can be adequately dealt with in a first-order logic system, after small modifications on the standard treatment. The proposed system, unlike plural logic, has the advantage of preserving completeness. And as a result, inferences such as (...) ‘Dick and Tony emptied the bottle, hence Tony and Dick emptied the bottle’ are shown to be first-order. (shrink)

Electrical brain activity modulation in terms of changes in its intensity and spatial distribution is a function of age and task demand. However, the dynamics of brain modulation is unknown when it depends on external factors such as training. The aim of this research is to verify the effect of deductive reasoning training on the modulation in the brain activity of healthy younger and older adults ( (mean age of 21 ± 3.39) and (mean age of 68.92 ± 5.72)). The (...) analysis reveals the benefits of training, showing that it lowers cerebral activation while increasing the number of correct responses in the trained reasoning task (). The brain source generators were identified by time-averaging low-resolution brain electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA) current density images. In both groups, a bilateral overactivation associated with the task and not with age was identified. However, while the profile of bilateral activation in younger adults was symmetrical in anterior areas, in the older ones, the profile was located asymmetrically in anterior and posterior areas. Consequently, bilaterality may be a marker of how the brain adapts to maintain cognitive function in demanding tasks in both age groups. However, the differential bilateral locations across age groups indicate that the tendency to brain modulation is determined by age. (shrink)

A number of recent writers have expressed scepticism about the viability of a specifically moral concept of obligation, and some of the considerations offered have been interesting and persuasive. This is a scepticism that has its roots in Nietzsche, even if he is mentioned only rather rarely in the debate. More proximately, the scepticism in question receives seminal expression in Elizabeth Anscombe's 1958 essay, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, a piece that is often paid lip-service to, but—like Nietzsche's work—has only rarely been (...) taken seriously by those wishing to defend the conception of obligation under attack. This is regrettable. Anscombe's essay is powerful and direct, and it makes a forthright case for the claim that, in the absence of a divine law conception of ethics, any specifically moral concept of obligation must be redundant, and that the best that can be hoped for in a secular age is some sort of neo-Aristotelianism. Anscombe is right about this, we think. And, among those who disagree, one of the very few to have taken her on at all explicitly is Christine Korsgaard, whose Kantianism of course commits her to the view that the concept of moral obligation is central, with or without God. Here, we try to show that Korsgaard loses the argument. (shrink)

Logic arguably plays a role in the normativity of reasoning. In particular, there are plausible norms of belief/disbelief whose antecedents are constituted by claims about what follows from what. But is logic also relevant to the normativity of agnostic attitudes? The question here is whether logical entailment also puts constraints on what kinds of things one can suspend judgment about. In this paper I address that question and I give a positive answer to it. In particular, I advance two logical (...) norms of agnosticism, where the first one allows us to assess situations in which the subject is agnostic about the conclusion of a valid argument and the second one allows us to assess situations in which the subject is agnostic about one of the premises of a valid argument. (shrink)

This paper is based on a criterion recently proposed by Richard Fumerton for demarcating philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I suggest to extend it to a demarcation criterion between philosophy and science in general, and put it in the context of the historical changes of boundaries between the philosophical and the scientifi c fi eld. I point to a number of philosophical claims and approaches that have been made utterly obsolete by the advancement of science, and conjecture that a (...) similar thing may happen in the future with today’s philosophy of mind: under the supposition that cognitive science manages to progress very successfully in a certain direction, our concepts for mental states could change, and the type of philosophical interest we put in them, thus reshaping thewhole debate on the subject. (shrink)

In this paper I present reasons for us to accept the hypothesis that suspended judgment has correctness conditions, just like beliefs do. Roughly put, the idea is that suspended judgment about p is correct when both p and ¬p might be true in view of certain facts that characterize the subject’s situation. The reasons to accept that hypothesis are broadly theoretical ones: it adds unifying power to our epistemological theories, it delivers good and conservative consequences, and it allows us to (...) assess processes of reasoning involving attitudes of suspended judgment. (shrink)

This work was my theses to get the MA in Philosophy. Their focus is the ethics implied in digital culture and networked society. Themes are Ethics, culture, technology, political control, autonomous systems.

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that we ought to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. In this paper, I criticize two arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit Broogard’s use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements against W.K. Clifford’s moral defense of. I then use this very distinction against a defense of inspired by Stephen Grimm’s more recent claims about the moral source of epistemic normativity. I use this distinction once again to (...) argue that Hilary Kornblith’s criticism of Richard Feldman’s defense of is incomplete. Finally, I argue that Feldman’s defense is insensitive to the relation between normative requirements and privileged values: values that have normative authority over us. (shrink)

En este artículo reflexionamos respecto de la técnica de observación en la metodología de las ciencias sociales. Nos proponemos construir una mirada amplia sobre la técnica de observación, que articule aspectos técnicos/operativos con reflexiones epistemológicas. Con este fin, discurrimos acerca de las cuestiones epistemológicas más relevantes a tomar en consideración, proponemos una clasificación de tipos de observación que sintetiza algunas de las definiciones existentes, y recuperamos algunos aprendizajes respecto del uso de la técnica en una experiencia de investigación empírica sobre (...) travestis/transmigrantes. Proponemos que la observación de campo comprende un conjunto de variantes que tienen en común la orientación teórica, la planificación flexible y la sistematización de registros, así como el hecho de diferenciarse tanto de la observación experimental como de la observación cotidiana. A su vez, postulamos cuatro ejes para ordenar las variantes de la observación de campo: participante-no participante, revelación-ocultamiento de la identidad del observador, estructurada-no estructurada, mediada tecnológicamente-no mediada tecnológicamente. En el plano operativo, destacamos la entrada a campo, la atribución de identidades y la negociación de roles como aspectos decisivos. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: In this text, we are going to try to introduce a few brief notes - without excessive pretensions -, concerning those things that, from a historical and also from an intellectual and point of view, surround the figures of Robert Owen, Fourier or Saint Simon. Certainly, intellectually, our sources do not let us notice a very specific influence on the "utopian socialists" of the 19th Century. It will be very difficult to find historical evidence. However, what we can do (...) is to assume the French Revolution of 1789 as a turning point for the radical traditions, both British and Continental, to introduce Romanticism as the real source from which the utopian nineteenth-century thought was derived from. Then, Romanticism is where we will be able to read something about Robert Owen. Likewise, we will approach a very succinct reading of paleo-socialism, focusing on the context of the British Islands where the Industrial Revolution took place to become another great event in the lifetime of the "utopian socialists". Key words: Christianity, Modernity, Industrialism, Utopian Socialism, Socialism, Rationality, History. (shrink)

In Meditations on First Philosophy, René Descartes argues that one cannot trust one’s senses since they are not a reliable source of obtaining knowledge of the world. One of Descartes’s main contentions to support such an argument is from his explanation of dreams, where one can feel one is awake but instead one is dreaming. Native Americans, however, may argue that the experiences one has in dreams are real and are a source of knowledge of the real world. Although Descartes (...) uses dreams to support his argument, some Native Americans have a different take on dreams. Dreams for Native Americans are a source of knowledge as well as a source for obtaining one’s identity. Gregory Cajete, in American Indian Thought, notes that “Dreams and Visions are a natural means for accessing knowledge and establishing relationship to the world. They are encouraged and facilitated.” In other words, it is through dreams that individuals are guided, destined, and informed. Therefore, dreams as understood by some Native Americans are an extension of reality that anticipate events that will happen or can happen. The focus of this paper is an exploration of the philosophical and religious epistemology pertaining to Native Americans as described in their accounts of dreams. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: In the present text, we are going to introduce a series of notes without excessive pretensions. In these pages, we will try to study figures like Cabet, Fourier or Saint - Simon, and we will do so in order to achieve better understanding concerning their own historical and their own intellectual context. Consequently and leaving our papers on Robert Owen behind, we plan to set special emphasis on the European Continent now. In a special way, we raise awareness on (...) the very significant role that these "utopian socialists" played between modernity and industrial modernity, and also between the 18th and 19th Centuries. Key words: Christianity, Modernity, Industrialism, Utopian Socialism, Socialism, Rationality, History. (shrink)

Consider a certain red rose. The proposition that the rose is red is true because the rose is red. One might say as well that the proposition that the rose is red is made true by the rose’s being red. This, it has been thought, does not commit one to a truthmaker of the proposition that the rose is red. For there is no entity that makes the proposition true. What makes it true is how the rose is, and how (...) the rose is is not an entity over and above the rose. It is against this view that I shall argue in this paper. I shall argue that a significant class of true propositions, including inessential predications like the proposition that the rose is red, are made true by entities. "No truthmaking without truthmakers" is my slogan. Although I have my view about what kinds of entities are truthmakers, I shall not argue for or presuppose that view here. All I shall argue for here is that if a proposition is made true by something, it is made true by some thing, but my argument will leave it open what kind of thing that thing is: it could be a fact or state of affairs, a trope, or any other sort of entity. (shrink)

The Razor says: do not multiply entities without necessity! The Laser says: do not multiply fundamental entities without necessity! Behind the Laser lies a deep insight. This is a distinction between the costs and the commitments of a theory. According to the Razor, every commitment is a cost. Not so according to the Laser. According to the Laser, derivative entities are an ontological free lunch: that is, they are a commitment without a cost. Jonathan Schaffer (2015) has argued that the (...) Laser should replace the Razor. In Sections 2-4 we shall discuss and argue against Schaffer’s arguments for replacing the Razor with the Laser. Schaffer considers several objections to his views, and in Sections 5-7 we shall argue that Schaffer does not deal successfully with two of them. In Section 8 we shall present a probabilistic argument for the Laser. However, the argument has a limitation and does not support the replacement of the Razor with the Laser. Indeed, it supports only the claim that, given certain assumptions, the multiplication of explanatorily relevant derivative entities does not matter; but, as we argue in the same section, there is an argument that multiplying explanatorily superfluous derivative entities does makes a theory less rationally acceptable. Our conclusion is that the Laser cannot replace the Razor and that derivative entities are not an ontological free lunch. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: In its historical deployment, socialist thought has attracted the attention of numerous experts and thinkers. The results reached from the above mentioned efforts, are quite irregular in fact. These studies are very often linked the marxist tradition, that shifted its identity to label previous social reformers as "utopian socialists". Specifically, our academic Spanish tradition has traditionally been dependant -historically and intellectually- on other Continental currents of thought. We state, that the preeminence and fundamental influence on our Spanish culture in (...) the Iberian Peninsula, has traditionally had its origin here, between modernity and industrialism, in France. Consistently, contributions concerning authors like Saint-Simon, Fourier or Cabet do exist. However, it is necessary to say that there is a bibliographical and very significant emptiness around one of the most relevant figures of European history in the 19th Century. Such emptiness has to do with the absence of publications concerning Robert Owen and his meaning in Spanish. Key words: Christianity, Modernity, Industrialism, Utopian Socialism, Socialism, Rationality, History. (shrink)